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Things are the same as their “essences”? 




Scholars argue that in Metaphysics Z-6 (or VII-6) Aristotle discusses an interesting ques-
tion about essence and identity: whether the essence of each thing is identical with that thing. 
Others argue that identity cannot be the issue, since the claim that the essence of each thing 
is identical with that thing is incompatible with the explanatory priority of the essence over 
the thing. I will argue for a rather deflationary view of this chapter. First, the chapter belongs 
to a “logikos” discussion of the notions of essence and substance, which has started at Z-4. The 
“logikos” standpoint is a preliminary discussion of some logical and formal features of essences 
and has no metaphysical depth. Second, the chapter mostly targets the specific Platonic view 
according to which a definiendum and its definiens cannot have a relation of mutual implica-
tion or coextensiveness between them.
Before going to a close examination of the passages from Z-6, I start with exegetical points 
of utmost importance. I am following the traditional English translations in using the word “es-
sence”, but one must keep in mind that the Greek expression for it is “to ti en einai”, which can 
be more literally translated as “what being is (for something)”. This expression is frequently 
  See Lewis [990], p. 340; Code [98], p. 3; Woods [975], p. 68; Loux [99], p. 9-3.
  See Charles [0].
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used with a dative complement, so that “to ti en einai anthropoi”, for instance, means “what be-
ing is for man” or “what it is for a man to be”.3 Many scholars believe that an expression like “to 
ti en einai anthropoi” is interchangeable with “to einai anthropoi”: both mean basically the same, 
i.e., “being for man” or “what being for man is”.4 This interchangeability might work for most 
contexts and I will not challenge it. But a more problematic step is the claim that both expres-
sions introduce a way of being: e.g., the way of being in virtue of which something is a man.5
I do not challenge the claim that both expressions might well introduce ways of being 
in many contexts. I do challenge the claim that these expressions introduce ways of being in 
Metaphysics Z-6. Aristotle’s discussions in further chapters of Metaphysics Z will play with the 
distinction between objects and ways of being. But I do not believe that this distinction plays 
any role in Z-6. In Metaphysics Z 4-6, expressions like “to ti en einai anthropoi” or “to einai anthro-
poi” are just place-holders for a description that is given as answer to the question “what man 
is?”, and this description is not meant to be a full explanatory account of man’s essence in terms 
of ways of being: it only selects a cluster of features that are good enough to identify all objects 
that are man.6 Expressions like “to ti en einai anthropoi” or “to einai anthropoi” (“the essence of 
man”) are replaceable with descriptions like “biped animal”, not with descriptions like “being a 
biped animal”. This point is very important for what follows in this paper. The “essence” we are 
talking about when we follow Aristotle’s text on the issue whether things are the same as their 
essences amounts to a deflationated notion with no metaphysical depth: the essence of man, for 
instance, is just a cluster of features (say, rational animal) that is good enough to assure a correct 
application of the  term “man”.
3  See Bostock [994], p. 86, for a survey of these issues.
4  This opinion is as old as Pseudo-Alexander’s commentary: see 480.-3.
5  See Charles [0] p. 5 for such a view.
6  In Metaphysics IV, 006a3 ff., “being-for-man” (to anthropoi einai) is what “man” (note the neuter ar-
ticle, to anthropos, at 006b7) signifies; now, at 006b5-6, Aristotle explains that the relation between “man” 
and “being-for-man” is similar to that between “cloak” (himation) and “robe” (lopion) – which is “oneness in 
number” as explained in Topics 03b4ff. (see note 4); and, at 006b3-4 and 3, it is clear that “being-for-man”, 
as what is signified by “man”, is replaced with “biped animal” – not with “being biped animal”. As to Aristotle’s 
usage of “to ti en einai”, see Topics 3a-3, where “biped pedestrian animal” is the example of a proprium that 
signifies “to ti en einai” for man. 
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To make this point clearer, it is worth considering that Aristotle makes room for differ-
ent sorts of definitions, i.e, different sorts of answer to the question “what X is?” A definition 
answering the question “what is thunder?” might well be (a) “the noise in the clouds which is 
caused by the quenching of fire”, (b) “such and such a noise in the clouds” or just (c) “fire being 
quenched”.7 The first one is a triadic definiens account which involves the causal factor (namely, 
the quenching of fire) that makes thunder be what it is. The second one is a definiens account 
which lacks this same causal factor, whereas the third one is a definiens account which focuses 
exactly on it or is exhausted with it. What is important here for my purposes is, firstly, that an 
expression like “what being is for thunder” might pick up any of these accounts (and be replace-
able with it) depending on the context.8 Secondly, accounts (a) and (b) can be taken as referring 
expressions that pick up exactly the thing supposed as definiendum, whereas account (c) might 
be taken as introducing a way of being – the feature that makes the definiendum be what it 
is. A consequence of this is that accounts (a) and (b) can be construed as predicates in identity 
statements with their definienda.9 Now, the most important point for my purposes is that, in 
Z-6, Aristotle is considering accounts like (b) – or at most accounts like (b) or (a), but (c) is out 
of the picture. Z-6 belongs to a “logical” approach which is not concerned with issues about 
explanatory power of definitions. 
There are other important exegetical preliminaries. So far I have discussed only one of the 
relata involved in the question Aristotle raises at the beginning of Z-6: “whether each thing is 
7  I am expanding the examples given by Charles [0], p. 58. See more about these types of definition 
in Charles [000], p. 3-55.
8  I cannot understand why Charles [0], p. 58-9, argues that “the phrase ‘what it is to be A’ seems to 
be used as a place-holder (at the logical level) for the relevant causally explanatory feature”. Charles believes 
that “to ti en einai” indicates “the feature [= a way of being] which makes the substance the one it is”. At least 
for the proprium, Aristotle oscillates in the Topics: in 33b7-8, the proprium of man is “being biped pedestrian” 
(einai pezon dipoun), but in 33a3 as well as in 36b0-, the proprium of man is “the biped pedestrian” (to pezon 
dipoun). It is reasonable to argue that such oscillation also applies to Aristotle’s uses of “to ti en einai” and “defi-
nition”. But the most important point is that one cannot infer from the use of the infinitive “einai” that Aristotle 
introduces a way of being.
9  See Charles [0], p. 55: “man = df the animal which is two-footed”. What is wrong according to 
Charles is to believe that an identity statement can involve an object and its definiens account in terms of way 
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the same as its essence or is different from it” (03a5-6). But something must be said about the 
other relatum as well: what “each thing” means in this context? Many scholars assume (some-
times without argument) that “each thing” picks up or at least involves the notion of an individual, 
like Socrates.0 I do not see any evidence for this assumption. The Greek expression is “hekaston” 
(“each”), which is absolutely neutral and ontologically non-commital. There is no evidence that 
the issue to be tackled in Z-6 is about individuals. First of all, at the end of the chapter, Aristotle 
says that “the question whether Socrates and being-for-Socrates are the same thing is obviously 
answered in the same way” (03a6-8), as if individuals like Socrates have not been considered 
so far in the overall discussion. Most importantly, Aristotle’s discussion does not mention any 
individual at all, nor does it involve any feature that characterizes an individual qua individual 
(like liability to generation and corruption etc.). I argue that individuals are not only far from 
being at the core of the discussion but also completely absent of it. “Hekaston” (“each”) rather 
refers in this context to the precise object of which it makes sense to say that it “has an essence”: 
definienda.3 Aristotle does not focus on any particular class of definienda: actually, he is only 
concerned with the question “whether each definiendum is the same as its definiens account”. 
Now, the relationship of sameness that is at stake is also very simple: it amounts to what 
is sometimes labelled “numerical unity” (or “oneness in number”, or “numerical identity”, from 
Topics 03b4-7ff.), but since “numerical unity” seems to be used differently by Aristotle in many 
other contexts (like Metaphysics 06b3ff.), I prefer to say that the “sameness” at stake in Z-6 
0  See Hartman [977], p. 58-6, Irwin [988], p. 6-7, Woods [975], p. 67-8, Loux [99], p. 0-4. A 
more refined approach is found in Furth [985], p. 4, who stresses the ambiguity of the expression “essence 
of X”: X may refer either to a definiendum (a universal) or to an individual, so that rational animal, for instance, 
is the essence of man not in the same way as it is the essence of Socrates. This actually develops what is found 
in Code [98], p. -3: the essence of Socrates will be “the signification of an apropriately related definition”, 
namely, the definition of the species man. Any way, Code’s and Furth’s views are expansions and developments 
from what we find in Z-6: I still do not see that Aristotle was concerned with establishing those points in Z-6.
  Ross’s translation with alterations. I am always assuming the Greek text as edited by Ross [94].
  See Charles [0], p. 57.
3  Some occurrences of “hekaston” in this sense include Metaphysics 036a 8, Posterior Analytics 7b 9, 
76a 4, 4, 6; Physics 84a , 94b 8. See a similar (if not identical) view in Charles [0], p. 57. Even Frede 
& Patzig [988], p. 43-4 (who believe that Aristotle is commited to individual forms) agree that “hekaston” does 
not refer to individual substances in this context.
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amounts to coextensiveness (or de dicto necessary coextensiveness) between each definiendum 
and its definiens account.4 This fits well with the logikos approach Aristotle has introduced in 
Z-4, which is only concerned with some minimal relations between definiendum and definiens 
(like non-circularity, coextensiveness, elucidativeness) and pays no attention to ontological and 
explanatory issues about definitions.5 
But why is Aristotle interested in discussing coextensiveness between definiendum and 
definiens? The logikos approach has established that every term can be taken as definiendum 
to be defined in an account that elucidates its meaning and guarantees a correct application of 
the term. Now, coextensiveness between definiendum and definiens might seem incompatible 
with the explanatory features of definitions. A definiens account must capture the basic causal 
factor that makes the definiendum what it is. This causal factor, inasmuch as it explains what 
makes the definiendum be what it is, must be prior to the it: it cannot be identical with the 
definiendum, since this would lead to the unwelcome result that the definiendum will be prior 
to itself.6 Now, what are the options to avoid this inconsistency between, on the one hand, the 
coextensiveness requirement for definitions and, on the other, the explanatory priority of the 
definiens over the definiendum?
Aristotle is arguing against one option to avoid this inconsistency in Z-6: an option 
presented by some version of Platonic theory of Forms. In this version of the theory, the co-
4  See Code [98], p. 3. The notion of “tauton” at Z-6 is the same one we find in Topics 03a 3-7 (as 
well as in many other Topics passages where definitions, sameness and propria are discussed. e.g., 45b3; 
46a6-7): “tauton” amounts to “numerical unity” (or “oneness in number”) in the sense of coextensiveness be-
tween two terms, or between a term and a description, or between two descriptions – for instance, between 
“cloak” (himation) and “robe” (lôpion) or between “man” and “biped pedestrian animal”. I agree with Charles 
[0], p. 55, when he says that a statement of identity in number in this sense “connects two referring expres-
sions”. An excellent survey of the options for taking the sameness relation at stake in Z-6 is found in Cohen 
[978], p. 75-6.
5  I have focused on the “logikos” approach in Z-4 at Angioni [03]. See Burnyeat [00], p. 9, -, for 
a similar view. I agree with Burnyeat that most of Z 4-6 is at the logikos level, but I argue that the basic feature 
of the logikos standpoint is the absence of any concern with the real causal-explanatory power of definitions, 
instead of mere absence of hylomorphism (hylomorphism is one way of tackling the issue of causal-explana-
tory power of definitions).
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extensiveness requirement is abandoned because it seems incompatible with the causal role 
ascribed to essences: an essence can explain what the definiendum is only if it is prior to it, 
and if it is prior to it, it must be an independently existent entity over and above the definien-
dum. The latter claim is Aristotle’s main target. In the overall context of the Metaphysics, he 
wants to prove that the causal priority of the essence over its object does not require it to be 
an independently existent entity. But in Z-6 his focus is more limited: he defends the coexten-
siveness requirement, showing that some arguments against it are not valid, whereas others 
lead to inconsistencies. As to the question about the compatibility between the coextensive-
ness requirement and the explanatory priority of the definiens over the definiendum, I cannot 
discuss it in this paper, which is focused on Z-6. But two things must be said. First, the asym-
metry required for the essence’s causal priority is compatible with a symmetrical relation on 
the ontological level: the essence cannot exist without the thing and vice-versa. Even if strict 
coextensiveness does not hold of each thing and its essence, a relation of mutual implication 
holds: if the essence of X exists, X exists; and if X exists, the essence of X exists; if the essence 
of X does not exist, X does not exist, and vice-versa. This symmetrical dependence about 
existence is compatible with the asymmetry required for the explanatory priority of essences.7 
Secondly, my opinion is that Aristotle’s ultimate model for definition, which will emerge only 
from Metaphysics VII-7 and VIII, will solve the issue: definitions like (a) have a triadic structure 
which preserves the coextensiveness requirement (since the description made of the triad of 
terms is “the same as the definiendum”) and at the same time have the basic causal factor (a 
way of being which cannot be “the same as the definiendum”) as one of its elements.
2.
Let me begin the analysis of the text. The discussion in Z-6 can be divided into two main 
parts. In the first one (03a9-8), Aristotle examines whether an accidental compound is the 
same as its essence. In the second one (03a8-03a4), Aristotle examines whether a per se 
thing is the same as its essence.8 
7  See Charles [0], p. 6, 69 and Peramatzis [0], p. 4 about this issue.
8  Many scholars take the central point in Z-6 as related to the Third Man Argument and to an infinite 
regress generated by the “non-identity assumption” in the Theory of Forms. See Owen [975], p. -5 and 
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The discussion in the first part is directed against the claim that an accidental compound 
cannot be the same as its essence.9 The argument for that claim is the following: white man 
could not be the same as the essence of white man (what-being-is-for-white-man), since, if it 
were, the essence of man must be the same as the essence of white man too. It is far from clear 
at a first glance why this unwelcome conclusion will follow. But, actually, it does not follow. Ar-
istotle gives us sufficient information to build the argument in the following way:
(i) white man is being-for-white-man;
(ii) man is white man (“as they say”, 03a 3);0
(iii) therefore, man is being-for-white-man. 
The unwelcome conclusion was not yet drawn. But it is easy to find how it could be 
reached. Even adversaries prompt to reject premise (i) will easily agree that sameness between 
something and its essence holds for cases like man. Thus, a fairly implied premise is:
(iv) man is being-for-man.
Woods [975], p. 69-70. For a sharp criticism of these views, see Code [98], p. 04-0. I do not believe that 
these issues play a central role in Aristotle’s strategy in Z-6.
9  Pseudo-Alexander (480.9-0, 480.38-48.4), as well as Ross, Frede & Patzig and many others (like 
Wedin [000], p. 59), believed that Aristotle was arguing for this claim, not against it. This interpretation is 
based on a series of misunderstandings of Aristotle’s discussion. Ross [94, p. 76] believed that the argument 
in 03a-4 was intended as a sound reductio ad absurdum of the claim that white man is the same as the 
essence of white man. Frede & Patzig [00], p. 44, are puzzled by the fact that Aristotle recognizes that the 
arguments supposed to lead to “his thesis” do not work. Burnyeat et alli [979], p. 33-6, who follow Ross, are 
also puzzled by 03a38: “it leaves Aristotle without any argument standing against the thesis that accidental 
unities are identical with their essence”. The fact is that Aristotle does not want any argument against it.
0  Burnyeat et alli 979: 33, believe that “as they say” (“hos phasin”, 03a 3) refer to the ordinary man, 
not to any philosopher. But there are two layers (so to speak) in this discussion: the ones who propose the 
argument concluding in sentence (v), and the ones who will deny (i) in order to avoid conclusion (v). See more 
on note 5.
  Such a language is indeed awkward, but according to my claim that “being-for-X” is replaceable with 
the description that gives a logikos definition of X, such a syllogism is equivalent to the following: (i) white 
man is (say) a biped animal that has whiteness; (ii) man is white man; (iii) therefore, man is a biped animal 
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Another fair assumption is that such an argument is taking all sentences as sameness 
statements. Maybe Aristotle and his adversaries would agree that sentences (i) and (iv) follow 
the pattern of statements in which a definiens is attributed to its definiendum, but the impor-
tant point is that they also would agree that these sentences are convertible. Then, assuming 
(iv’), the converse of (iv), as a minor premise and sentence (iii) as a major, we get the following 
argument:  
(iii) man is being-for-white-man;
(iv’) being-for-man is man;
(v) therefore, being-for-man is being-for-white-man.3
Sentence (v) is exactly the conclusion announced in 03a- as an unwelcome result of 
the claim that an accidental compound is the same as its essence. This claim itself is represented 
as premise (i) above. But there are three things entangled in the text: first, the arguments them-
selves from (i) to (v); second, adversaries’ reaction against these arguments; third, Aristotle’s 
criticism of this reaction. Sentence (v) is unacceptable not only for Aristotle but also for his 
adversaries. But these adversaries want to avoid this conclusion by dropping premise (i): they 
argue that accidental compounds cannot be the same as their essences.4
  Sameness as taken in 03a- is enough for convertibility.
3  Again, such a syllogism is equivalent to the following: (i) man is a biped animal that has whiteness; (ii) 
rational animal is man; (iii) therefore, rational animal is a biped animal that has whiteness. From a formal point 
of view, these arguments (i)-(ii)-(iii) and (iii)-(iv’)-(v) follow the pattern proposed by Ross [94, p. 76], which 
in my opinion is flawless (see also Frede & Patzig [00], p. 46). The problem is how Ross understands what 
is going on. See note 5.
4  Pseudo-Alexander (480.6-9) has taken the adversary argument as a single syllogism in the third 
figure: (a) man is the same as white man; (b) man is the same as being-for-man; therefore, (c) white man is 
the same as being-for-man. There are three major problems with this interpretation. First, conclusion (c) is not 
what Aristotle announces at 03a- as an unwelcome result (“being-for-man and being-for-white-man 
will be the same”). Second, no place is assigned in this argument for the premise that white man is the same as 
being-for-white-man (which is taken up with “ei gar to auto” at 03b and seems to be the target of a reduction, 
see Ross [94], 76). Finally, this third figure syllogism is invalid if the conclusion is intended (as it should) 
as a universal statement. This probably has led Pseudo-Alexander (and others) to believe that Aristotle’s main 
target was a dull sophist that could be refuted with the first lectures on syllogistics. However, the sophistic 
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Thus, the claim that accidental compounds are not the same as their essences is, in the 
context of Z-6, an adversary’s clumsy attempt to avoid the conclusion of a sophistical argument.5 
This claim is far from being an Aristotelian one. Aristotle’s way of avoiding the conclusion of the 
sophistical argument is to show that it is not a sound argument: it is based on the assumption 
that all its sentences could be taken as sameness statements in the same way.6 But this assump-
tion is false, as Aristotle remarks: “the extreme terms do not become the same [as the middle 
term] in the same way” (03a 5), and this fact jeopardizes the soundness of the argument.7
In the first argument, both premises can be taken as sameness claims: premise (i) claims 
that white man is the same as being-for-white-man, whereas premise (ii) claims that man is the 
same as white man. But for Aristotle the kind of sameness involved in each claim is different. 
Premise (i) can be taken as a sound claim that the description “white man” is necessarily coex-
tensive with its definiens account, “being-for-white-man”. Aristotle is not concerned with deep 
ontological issues about accidental compounds having essences or not. His answer to such issues 
would arguably be that no accidental compound has a real essence of the same type ascribed 
to natural kinds or to hylomorphic compounds (see 030a-7). In Z-4, he has clearly said that 
argument itself is more elaborated, and Aristotle’s main target is rather a clumsy attempt to refute it.
5  Pseudo-Alexander (“since some said that being-for-man is the same as being-for-white-man, [Aristo-
tle] takes the argument by which they have concluded this and so refute it”, 480.9-) did not notice that there 
are three things involved: (i) an eristic argument claiming to conclude that being-for-man is the same as being-
for-white-man, (ii) an attempt to avoid this eristic conclusion by abandoning its first premise, (iii) Aristotle’s 
criticism of this attempt. The expression “it migh plausibly seem” (doxeien an) at 03a9 introduces (ii), not 
(iii). Ross [94, p. 76-7] did not notice the “three-layers” of the discussion, nor Frede & Patzig [00], p. 45-6, 
who then are led to take (iii) as a piece of Aristotle’s self-criticism and the expression “it migh plausibly seem” 
(doxeien an) as a sign of caution.
6  Even Pseudo-Alexander (480.4-6) has seen that the core of the sophistic argument rests on a failure 
to distinguish different sort of sameness statements.
7  See Ross [94], p. 76 (although he believes that Aristotle intended the argument to be a sound re-
ductio against (i)). Pseudo-Alexander (480.-4) claims that, in the sentence “the extremes do not become the 
same” 03b5), we must supply an implicit complement: “to a being per se”. He is surely thinking of the con-
clusion of his invalid third figure syllogism, “white man is the same as being-for-white-man”. But is is hard to 
guess what Pseudo-Alexander has done with “hosautos”: this adverb makes it clear that Aristotle is describing 
what happens in both premises (“each extreme does not become the same [as the middle] in the same way as 
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accidental compounds like white man do not count as primary things and, consequently, do not 
have essences and definitions in the strictest sense. Nonetheless, accidental compounds can be 
defined at a logikos level through accounts that satisfy some minimal requirements: accounts 
that will elucidate the meaning of the terms for accidental compounds and be coextensive with 
them. At this logikos standpoint, Aristotle is happy with the claim that the description “white 
man” (or whatever term arbitrarily introduced for picking up the same entity referred to by that 
description, like “cloak”, 09b7-8) is “the same” with a “more accurate description” (030a6) 
which explains what being a white man amounts to – like a description saying that “this is at-
tributed to that” (030a5-6).8 Now, Z-6 discussion belongs to this logikos standpoint, so that 
“being-for-white-man” is just a shortcut for this more precise description. Aristotle agrees that 
premise (i) follows the pattern of a logikos definition. Therefore, he accepts that “white man” is 
the same as “being-for-white-man” since every definiendum is the same as its definiens. “The 
same” in this context does not mean anything more than “coextensive”, or “necessarily coexten-
sive” if the necessity is taken as de dicto.
The story is completely different for premise (ii). This sentence can only be taken as true 
if its subject refers to a particular man that happens to be white. But there is no necessary co-
extensiveness between the terms. There is just an accidental overlap: in some circumstance, it 
just happens that a certain man is white, so that he satisfies all necessary and sufficient require-
ments for being denominated by the description “white man”. But from this occasional fact it 
does not follow that this man is necessarily a white man, since he may loose the relevant proper-
ties that made him a white man and still continues to be a man. 
Sentence (iii) itself is acceptable on similar terms. If being-for-white-man is just a shortcut 
for the more accurate description that elucidates the meaning of the description “white man”, 
there is no worry in accepting that a man, like Socrates, is being-for-white-man if he is a white 
man. If “being for-white-man” is equivalent to such a description like “a rational animal with pale 
skin”, it is clear that Socrates, being a white man, is a rational animal with pale skin. Sentence (iii) 
follows as conclusion if the sameness involved is understood as it was in premise (ii).
The problem rests on the step taken in the second argument. Premise (iv’) is acceptable: 
8  Aristotle knows perfectly well that a decription can be taken as definiendum: see Topics 0a (a defi-
nition can be a “logos that is given in the place of a logos”). See Code [98], p. .
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given that a definiendum term and its definiens are necessarily coextensive, the definitional 
statement (iv) is convertible into (iv’). The problem consists in taking this premise together with 
premise (iii) as if they were sameness claims at the same level. As I have said, sentence (iii) itself 
might be perfectly acceptable: the predicate that explicitates the meaning of “white man” is at-
tributed to a particular man that happens to be a white man. But sentence (iii) is far from estab-
lishing that this man is the same as being-for-white-man in the same sense in which man is the 
same as being-for-man. Sentence (iii) does not claim any necessary coextensiveness between 
man and being-for-white-man.
Thus, conclusion (v) does not follow from premises (iii) and (iv’) exactly because the same-
ness claim in each premise is different from the other.9 Aristotle explains that “the extremes”30 
are not the same as the middle term in the same way: “being-for-man” is the same as “man” in 
the sense of being necessarily coextensive with it, whereas “man” and “being-for-white-man” 
are the same merely in the sense that they happen to refer to the same entity in a particular, 
contingent circumstance. The result is that there is no real middle term for the argument: there 
is a shift in the reference of “man” from premise (iii) to premise (iv’). Thus, on closer examina-
tion, the premises have four, not three terms, and nothing follows from them. “Man” in premise 
(iv’) is taken universally as a general term, and “being-for-man” is the shorcut for the definiens 
account that is necessarily coextensive with this general term. On the other hand, if premise 
(iii) is taken seriouly as a true statement, it is clear that “man” can only refer to a particular man 
that happens to have a pale skin (or happens to have the relevant feature to be called a “white 
man”). A rephrasing of those premises on this more accurate analysis will render: 
(iii) [this] man [= Socrates] is being-for-white-man;
(iv’) being-for-man is man;
(v) therefore, being-for-man is being-for-white-man.
Since there is no real middle term, no conclusion follows.3
9  See Lewis [99], p. 85-40 for an exhaustive treatment of this topic. See also Williams [985], p. 7-9.
30  Aristotle’s talk of “extremes” was what has led me to reconstruct the argument in syllogistic form.
3  My use of “this” on re-interpreted (iii) does not mean to introduce a particular quantifier; “this” was just 
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3.
In a very short passage (03a5-8), Aristotle considers a reply from his adversary. Sup-
pose the adversary agreeing with Aristotle’s way of blocking conclusion (v) by pointing to the 
absence of a real middle term: it is the general term “man” that is the same as “being-for-man”, 
whereas it is a particular man, Socrates, that is the same as “being-for-white-man”. The adver-
sary now replies with an argument in which there is a real middle term and this middle term 
is the same as both extremes in the same way: in an accidental way. Suppose a man, Socrates, 
who happens to be a white man and at the same time a musical man, so that (iii) “man is be-
ing-for-white” will be true about him as well as (vi) “man is being-for-musical”. The truth of this 
last statement will be grounded in a reasoning similar to (i)-(ii)-(iii): if this man, Socrates, is 
really a white man, then he has the relevant feature which is picked up in the definiens account 
elucidating the meaning of “white man”; similarly, if he is really a musical man, then he has the 
relevant feature which is picked up in the definiens account elucidating the meaning of “musical 
man”. From this, the following argument might be presented:
 (iii) man [= Socrates] is being-for-white[-man].3
(vi’) being-for-musical[-man] is man [= Socrates].
(vii) being-for-musical[-man] is being-for-white[-man].33
Adversaries now can argue that both extremes turn out to be the same as the middle term 
in a same way, namely, accidentally (with EJ reading).34 Alternatively (especially with Ab read-
ing),35 they will claim that both extremes, namely, descriptions that are accidentally attributed to 
3  I take “to leukoi einai” and “to mousikoi” to be shortcut for “to leukoi anthropoi einai” and “to mousikoi an-
thopoi einai”. See Ross [94], p. 77.
33  For a different view of the formal structure of the argument, see Ross [94, p. 77]. Ross was misled by 
his belief that Aristotle was trying to deny that accidental compounds can be the same as their essences.
34  Manuscripts EJ omit the article “ta” in 03a7, so that “kata symbebekos” (a) must be taken as an adverb 
modifying “gignesthai” (03a6) and (b) can be taken as describing the way in which each extreme becomes 
the same as the middle (which was the point criticized at 03a5). In favour of this reading, “kata symbebekos” 
will be in perfect contrast with “ou [...] hosautos” at 03a5.
35  Manuscript Ab has an article “ta” in 03a7, so that (a) “kata symbebekos” must be taken as playing the 
role of  adjectif of “ta akra” (“the accidental extremes, i.e., the middle terms that have become accidentally the 
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the same thing, turn out to be really the same in the conclusion. Both readings are after all good 
ones: with the first one, the text will be describing what happens in both premises; with the 
second one, the text will be rather describing what the adversary claims to result in the conclu-
sion. But the general outcome is the same.
Maybe Aristotle’s point would be sharper with Ab reading: he denies that the conclusion 
(vii) has really established that being-for-musical is the same as being-for-white. In this case, 
“dokei de ou” is denying “sumbainei”, which must be taken as “results in the conclusion”. An ap-
propriate translation will be: “maybe this would seem to result in the conclusion, namely, both 
extremes (which are accidentally the same as the middle) turning out to be the same; however, 
this does not seem to be so”. The reason for the failure of the attempted conclusion could not 
any more be the absence of a real middle term. “Man” stands for the same entity in premises 
(iii) and (vi’), and this middle term is the same as each extreme in the same way. However, the 
argument is still invalid, and the main reason is that both sentences (iii) and (vi’) state a contin-
gent relation between theirs terms. If premise (iii) is taken seriously as a true statement, it just 
says that a particular man happens to have a pale skin (or happens to have the relevant feature 
to be called a “white man”). The same would apply to premise (vi’), although it is more awk-
ward because the subject-predicate order is inverted: if it is a true statement, it can only mean 
that a given thing, to which it happens to have musical instruction (or whatever feature that is 
relevant to be called a “musical man”), is the same as this particular man.36 Now, if one ac-
cepts this meaning for (vi’), one must also accept that the conversion of (vi) into (vi’) is merely 
superficial: in its “deep grammar”, (vi’) is still saying that a particular man happens to have 
the relevant feature to be called a “musical man”.37 Once the superficiality of the converse (vi’) 
same as the middle”) and (b) the emphasis of the sentence will be on “gignesthai tauta”, “become the same” 
as describing the conclusion. In favour of this reading, there are two factors: first, the contrast between “ekeino 
doxeien an sumbainein” (“there will seem to be a sound consequence”, 03a6) and “ouk ananke” (“it does not 
follow”, 03a4) will be enhanced; second, it is compatible with EJ reading as well, since “kata symbebekos” 
– even if it is adverbial – can also be taken as describing the way in which the extremes become the same as 
each other.
36  Another way to attack the adversary reply is to argue that (vi) cannot be really converted into (vi’).  
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is shown, the reply is reduced to a fallacy of the accident, in which the adversary claims that 
what is attributed to the subject (“man”) must also be attributed to its accident (“being a white 
man”).38 It is clear, then, that from statements of contingent co-reference between a subject and 
a description such as (iii) and (vi) one cannot jump to the conclusion that one description is 
also an attribute of the other – and it will be even more absurd to claim, like in (vii), that both 
descriptions are necessarily coextensive with each other. 
Therefore, in order to avoid unwelcome conclusions such as (v) and (vii), Aristotle does 
not need to deny that accidental compounds are the same as their essences, that is, he need 
not reject sentence (i). In this context, “being the same as its essence” has a logikos meaning: 
it merely amounts to being necessarily coextensive with the description that introduces the 
essence. There is no reason to attribute to Aristotle the thesis that accidental compounds are 
not the same as their essence, nor the thesis that accidental compounds do not have essences 
at all.39 It might be objected that in 03a8 Aristotle goes to the second part of his argument 
without any explicit conclusion about the first part, as if he had left open the issue about acci-
dental compounds having essences. However, although Aristotle has established that acciden-
tal compounds do not have essences and definitions in a stricter sense (030a-4), he has also 
established that they have essences and definitions at the logikos level. His conclusion at Z-4 
was that “even white man will have an account and definition, but in a different way from the 
definition of whiteness and of a given substance” (030b-3). And Z-6 argument still works on 
the logikos point of view.   
38  By “the fallacy of the accident”, I have in mind what Aristotle presents at Soph. Elenchi 66b8-3. The 
argument now seems to be well reducible to a third figure fallacy. But the fact that the reply at 03a5-8 can 
be reduced to the third figure does not prove that the original argument alluded to at 03a-5 must also be 
cast in the third figure, as Pseudo-Alexander has understood (see note 4).
39  Code [98], p. 9, says that Z-6 thesis (i.e., the identity between each thing and its essence) can be 
extended to “any definable object, whether a primary substance or not”, but it is not clear whether he will con-
sider accidental compounds as one of these “derivative cases” of definition and essence. Cohen [978], p. 78, 
rejects what he calls the “abstract interpretation” because it will lead to the thesis that accidental compounds 
are the same as their essences.
THINGS ARE THE SAME AS THEIR “ESSENCES”? NOTES ON ARISTOTLE’S METAPHYSICS Z-6
51
volume 16
números 1 e 2
2012
4.
The second part of Z-6 discussion examines whether “each item said in itself (kath’ hauto)” 
is the same as its essence (03a8-9). For brevity’s sake, let me call these items “per se things”. 
It is not clear either the meaning or the extension of this description in this context,40 but two 
points are clear: things picked up by this description seems to be opposed to accidental com-
pounds, and Aristotle straightaway focuses on Platonic Forms (or on some version of Platonic 
theory of Forms).4 The text reads as follows: 
“But in the case of per se things, it is necessary for a thing to be the same as its essence, 
for instance, if there are some substances which have no other substances nor natures prior to 
them, as some say the Forms are? If the being-for-Good is to be different from the Good Itself, 
and the being-for-Animal is to be different from Animal Itself, [...], there will, firstly, be other 
substances and natures and Forms besides those which are asserted, and, secondly, these others 
will be prior substances if essence is substance” (03a9-b3).4
Aristotle’s argument is very compact and entangled, but it seems to ascribe the following 
assumptions to Platonists: 
() Forms are substances in such a way that there are no other substances prior to them.
() Forms have essences. 
40  I will discuss what this expression means as I will examine passage 03b-8. For now, let me say 
that I do not see any deep metaphysical texture into it, like Frede & Patzig [00], p. 48, do.
4  The reason for this focus on Platonic Forms is far from resting on the assumption that what will prove 
true about them will also be true about per se things of “this world”, as Pseudo-Alexander (48.7-) has assu-
med. Ross [94], p. 77 believes that Aristotle’s purpose is to use Forms as an “illustration” of the sameness of 
a per se thing with its essence. This sounds funny, since the Platonists themselves do not believe in this same-
ness. A much better story is found in Charles [0], p. 6-5: Aristotle is arguing that an essence cannot be an 
independent entity “over and above” the thing of which it is the essence, as Platonists have believed.
4  Revised Oxford Translation with modifications. I cannot agree with the translation “so-called self-sub-
sistent things” for “kath’ hauta legomena”, since self-subsistency is completely out of the picture in the discus-
sion. For this expression, Bostock’s translation is better: “things which are spoken of in their own right” (Bos-
tock, 994, p. 8). It is worth stressing that I take the Greek text from Ross’s edition and do not accept Jaeger’s 
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Given those assumptions, Aristotle argues that if a Form is not the same as its essence 
(which is what the Platonist claims), the latter will be prior to it in such a way that will jeopardize 
the primacy of Forms as stated in (). In short, the core of the argument is that assumptions () 
and () are incompatible with each other. But it is far from clear how the argument works and 
what exactly Aristotle targets. There seems to be an implied assumption like this (03b-3):
(3) (a) If a per se thing is not the same as its essence, (b) its essence is (a substance or a 
nature) prior to it.
But it is far from clear at a first glance whether (3) is a premise from Aristotle’s criticism 
or from adversaries’ implied assumptions. Besides, since there seems to be an incompatibility 
between (), () and (3) applied to Forms, one might wonder which of these claims Aristotle 
would suggest to throw out in order to avoid the inconsistency, as well as which of these claims 
is Aristotle’s main target in Z-6 discussion. 
It may prove useful to look at the second part of Aristotle’s discussion of per se things 
(03b3-5), since at the end of it Aristotle seems to be arguing that the antecedent of (3) is 
wholly wrong. The passage starts as follows: “Besides, if these things are severed from one an-
other, there will be no knowledge of the ones [sc. the Forms] while the others [sc. the essences] 
will not be beings at all. (By ‘severed’ I mean, if the being-for-Good does not belong to Good 
Itself, and if being good does not belong to being-for-Good). For there is knowledge of each 
thing only when we know its essence etc.” (03b3-7).43
The core of Aristotle’s argument seems clear enough. On the one hand, to know X is equiv-
alent to grasp the essence of X. If the essence of X is not the same as X, grasping it would not lead 
to knowing X itself, which seems absurd. On the other hand, the fact that the essence of X belongs 
to X is what makes X what it is. If the essence of X is not the same as X in the sense of not belong-
ing to X, then X could not be what it is, which also seems absurd. Besides, the essence of X, being 
separated from X, would not be X. The result Aristotle draws from this is the following: “It must be, 
then, that the good and being-for-good are one [sc. the same]44 thing, [...], and so with all things 
43  This is partly Revised Oxford Translation (ROT), partly my own translation (since it would be mislea-
ding to say that I have only modified ROT).
44  Aristotle uses “hen” (“one”), not “tauto” (“the same”), but this is no surprise, since the notion of “same-
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which are not said of something else, but are said per se and are primary” (03b-4). 
Now, this remark sounds like a denial of (3a), the antecedent of (3): it cannot be true that 
a per se thing is not the same as its essence. Aristotle commits himself rather to the claim that:
(3a*) A per se thing is the same as its essence.
Aristotle’s commitment to (3a*) can also be found at the final remarks of the chapter 
(03a4-6). But it is not clear how this commitment, which results from the second part of his 
discussion of per se things (03b3-5) relates to the first part (03a9-b3). In order to show 
the inconsistency between () and (), Aristotle needed a further interpretation of (3b), the 
consequent of (3), such as:
(3bF) The essence of a Form is (a substance or a nature) prior to it.
There is a blatant inconsistency between () and (3bF). Now, why Aristotle has not tar-
geted (3bF) straightaway, instead of targeting the antecedent of the conditional (3)? It is not 
clear how (3a*) will generate trouble for the Platonic theory, since the denial of the antecedent 
(3a) in (3) cannot affect the truth of the consequent (3b).45 But if the truth of the consequent 
(3b) is not affected by the rejection of the antecedent (3a) – and this rejection was the point at 
03b-4 –, it is most unclear how assumption (3) is related to the discussion about () and (). 
The whole of Aristotle’s discussion at 03a8ff. would seem to be a terrible mess.
My solution is the following. Aristotle’s discussion suggests that his adversaries regard (3) 
as rather a bicondicional:
(3) (a) If a per se thing is not the same as its essence, (b) its essence is (a substance or a 
nature) prior to it.
This thesis is convertible with the following one: if a per se thing’s essence is (a substance 
or a nature) prior to it, this thing is not the same as its essence. The outcome is a bicondicional:
ness” involved here, which is merely coextensiveness, is described as “numerical oneness” (“hen arithmoi”) in 
Topics 03a3-4 ff., so that Aristotle can use “hen” and “tauto” interchangeably in this context: see 03b9, 3; 
03a, 6.
45  Topics b7-3 (see also a9-; 3b5-6; 4b7-4) shows that Aristotle was well aware of 
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(3’) (b) Iff a per se thing’s essence is (a substance or a nature) prior to it, (a) this thing is 
not the same as its essence.
Understanding (3) in this way, as (3’), allows us to understand why Aristotle targets (a) 
in his discussion. First of all, Aristotle tries to show that to deny (a) is the only way available for 
the Platonists to preserve () and to avoid inconsistency in their theory. The denial of (a) entails 
the denial of (b), so that Forms might have essences and still be substances which no other 
substances are prior to. But this is not the end of the story, of course. Aristotle’s main purpose 
is not merely to point to internal inconsistencies in his adversaries’ theory. Aristotle is targeting 
(b) itself, or, to put it more precisely, the underlying aim of Aristotle’s discussion is to reject (b),46 
but since (b) entails (a) – (a) is a result of (b) at the logikos level –, Aristotle focuses on (a), for his 
discussion is still on the logikos level.
It is important to stress that (b) is another assumption of the Platonists. Aristotle would 
agree with them that the essence of X must be prior to X itself. But Aristotle understands this 
priority in a very different way. A common ground between him and the Platonists is to ascribe 
a causal or explanatory priority to essences: the essence of X is what makes X be what it is and, 
for this reason, has an explanatory priority over X. Now, causal or explanatory priority is, for 
Aristotle, an asymmetrical relation which is compatible with many symmetrical relations like 
mutual entailment and coextensiveness.47 The essence of X, being explanatorily prior to X, can 
perfectly well be “the same as X” in the sense of being necessarily convertible with X. Accord-
ingly, a definiens account of X, which reports the essence of X, is a description which is neces-
sarily coextensive with X. 
In Z-6, Aristotle does not focus on these points about explanatory priority. But the reader 
of Z-6 cannot ignore that his Platonic adversaries would rather claim that causal or explanatory 
priority is not compatible with symmetrical relations like mutual implication or coextensiveness. 
The essence of X has causal or explanatory priority over X. But, for the Platonists, in order to 
have this sort of causal priority, the essence must also have a distinctive kind of ontological pri-
46  Aristotle targets (b) more directly in contexts like Metaphysics Z 3-4, although this is a highly contro-
versial view. I have defended it in Angioni [008]. 
47  See Categories 4b0-, Posterior Analytics 78a8ff.
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ority: it must be a prior entity which exist and is what it is independently of X.48 More precisely, 
the essence of X must be a substance prior to X. Thus, the Platonist is committed to the follow-
ing assumption:
(4) If Y is the essence of X, Y is a substance prior to X.
In Platonic terminology, the essence of X must be a substance separated from X or over and 
above X,49 and this ontological separation makes it impossible for the account of X’s essence to 
refer exactly to the same thing X: it must refer to a different thing, namely, Y. From the fact that 
such an ontological priority of Y over X is incompatible with sameness (i.e., coextensiveness) 
between X and Y, it follows another important claim of the Platonist:
(5) If Y is a substance prior to X, Y is distinct from X.
Now, (5) itself may be unproblematic, but from (4) together with (5), it follows:
(6) If Y is the essence of X, Y is distinct from X.
It is easy to see now that (3’) is just a compact version of (4) together with (6): actually, 
the conditional (4) was packed into the component (3b) of (3) or (3’). Now, applying claim (6) 
to Forms, one reaches what we actually find in Aristotle’s text:
(7) Being-for-Good, which is the essence of Good Itself, is distinct from Good Itself 
(03a3-).
There is no doubt that “auto to agathon” in 03a3 introduces a Form and “to agathoi einai” 
introduces its essence. We can now understand what Aristotle is doing in 03a9-b3. If (3’) is 
taken as a background assumption, it is enough to put it together with (7) to have the following 
result: 
48  I disagree with Gill [003], p. 79, who claims that Platonic Forms are identical with their essences 
because they are explanatorily primary. According to Platonic assumption (4), the essence of a Form must be a 
distinct entity existing separetely from that Form. 
49  See Charles [0], p. 6-. At Metaphysics 999a7-, Aristotle reports the requirement that causes 
must be separated from the things of which they are causes. Since essence is a cause and Forms were intended 
as essences (see 988b4-5), Platonists believed that Forms must be separated inasmuch as they are essences. I 
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(8) Being-for-Good, which is the essence of a Form (the Good Itself), is a substance prior 
to that Form (the Good Itself) and cannot be the same as that Form.
It is very clear that (8) is incompatible with ():
() Forms are substances in such a way that there are no other substances prior to them.
If (8) is true, then it is not true that the Form named “The Good Itself” is a substance which 
no other substance is prior to. Therefore, Aristotle is showing that some version of theory of 
Forms collapses into claims inconsistent with each other. Whoever are the “ones” (tines) referred 
to at 03a3, they cannot maintain at the same time claims (), () and (3’). Now, as I have 
said, (3’) is a compact version of (4) and (6). Claim (4) can be taken as a hardcore metaphysi-
cal claim that gives this version of theory of Forms its specific feature. As such, claim (4) is the 
special target of many discussions in the Metaphysics.50 On the other hand, claim (6) – which 
follows from (4) and (5) – is the outcome of that metaphysical claim on the level of logical rela-
tions between per se things (taken as definienda) and their essences (taken as definiens). Since 
chapter Z-6 is still located at the logikos level, Aristotle’s focus is only to reject (6). Of course, 
rejection of (6) will ultimately lead to rejection of (3’) and (4), and Aristotle would rather suggest 
to the Platonist to preserve () and () instead of (3’). But Aristotle’s focus in the second part of 
Z-6 is only to argue that non-sameness (non-coextensiveness) between a definiendum and its 
definiens account is not required to make sense of the notion of essence. Claim (6), therefore, 
is Aristotle’s target at the second part of Z-6 as well as the clumsy attempt to reject sentence (i) 
was his target at the first part of Z-6. In the first part of Z-6, Aristotle has shown that the prem-
ise that accidental compounds are the same as their essences leads to no absurd consequence, 
since the reductio accepted by his adversaries was not a valid argument. Similarly, in the second 
part of Z-6, Aristotle has shown that the requirement of explanatory priority for essences does 
not lead to any asymmetrical ontological independence of essences over their objects. There-
fore, Aristotle’s ultimate view in the second part of Z-6 is that (6) is wrong: at a logikos level, X 
and X’s essence, i.e., a definiendum and its definiens account, are necessarily coextensive with 
each other: “Now from these arguments, each thing and its essence are one and the same not 
per accidens, as well as because to know each thing is to know its essence” (03b8-).
50  See note 49.
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Thus, Aristotle’s own view is that a per thing is one and the same as its essence, and be-
ing one and the same in this case merely amounts to being necessarily coextensive with each 
other. Aristotle’s argument has no metaphysical depth on the issue whether the essence is a 
way of being rather than an object. Nor does he argue against claim (4) in this context. The 
notion of essence in this context is taken at the logikos level: “essence” (i.e., to ti en einai) is just 
a shortcut for the set of features that identifies the definiendum and establishes what it is in a 
general way – with no attention to ontological and explanatory issues about it. Aristotle’s only 
issue is whether the definiendum and its definiens account are necessarily coextensive with 
each other.5
5. 
One might object that Aristotle has never explicitly said that accidental compounds can 
be the same as their essences: quite on the contrary, at 03b-8, he has rather suggested or 
implied that they are not the same as their essences.
My answer requires a discussion of the expression “not per accidens” (“ou kata symbe-
bekos”) at 03b9 and at 03b-8. Most scholars take “not per accidens” as equivalent to 
“not contingently” and therefore, as equivalent to “necessarily”. This interpretation is tempting 
because the sameness between definiendum and definiens as understood in this discussion is 
necessary – if the necessity is taken as de dicto. However, this is not what Aristotle means. I am 
not saying that Aristotle will be committed to the contrary claim, that the sameness between 
definiendum and definiens is not necessary in this sense. Of course, it is necessary. What I am 
saying is that Aristotle’s point with the expression “not per accidens” at 03b is quite different: 
“not per accidens” stresses that each thing (“hekaston” at 03b) is the same as its essence if 
it is not taken as an attribute (not as a symbebekos). This interpretation, which fits perfectly well 
what I have said about the logikos level, will be clearer from my discussion of Aristotle’s next 
step, which reads as follows:
5  His second argument for his own view – that to know each thing is to know its essence (03b0-) 
– can perfectly well be interpreted as relying on the minimal claim that to know what a given thing is amounts 
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“Now, (i) concerning that which is used as attribute (“to kata symbebekos legomenon”), 
like, for instance, the musical and the white, (ii) it is not true to say that the item itself is the 
same as its essence, (iii) because it signifies in two ways; in fact, [“white”] signifies not only 
that to which white is attributed but also what is attributed. Consequently, (iv) in some way 
the item itself is the same as its essence, but in another way it is not. (v) For [the essence of 
white] is not the same as a man, that is, as a white man;5 (vi) but it is the same as the property.” 
(03b-8).
This passage is highly controversial. The most important point is how to understand the 
expression “to kata symbebekos legomenon”, which most scholars take as introducing terms re-
ferring to accidents like “white” and “musical”.53 I argue that Aristotle is not talking about these 
terms, although they are chosen as most conspicuous examples. The expression “to kata symbe-
bekos legomenon” must be understood as introducing a way of taking or using terms in the con-
text of a given sentence: a term “kata symbebekos legomenon” is a term (from whatever category) 
taken according to what it refers to. When Aristotle says that “white is kata symbebekos musical”, 
he means that the thing to which “white” happens to refer in a given context, say, a particular 
man, has the property of being musical. The same apply to a sentence like “man is kata sym-
bebekos musical”: the thing to which “man” happens to refer in a given context, say, a particu-
lar man, has the property of being musical.  The clause “kata symbebekos” indicates that, in the 
context of a given sentence, what the term denotes is more important than its straightforward 
meaning.54 The expression is opposed to “kath’ hauto legomenon”, which in turn means that a 
5  I read both articles in the “men” clause in the dative, as the editors (Bekker, Ross, Jaeger). The dative is 
better for the parallelism with “toi pathei” in the “de” clause. I take “the being-for-white” as the implied subject 
of “tauto” in both men- and de-clauses, whereas the datives “toi anthropoi” and “toi leukoi anthropoi” are comple-
ments of “tauto” (connected with each other by an epexegetic “kai”). The issue is whether being-for-white is the 
same as man or as white man (as Bostock’s translation suggests). 
53  This view is favoured by Pseudo-Alexander’s commentary, 484.4-5: he believes that “pathos” at 
03b7 refers to things like the music in the soul of Socrates.
54  Some traditional mistakes (as well as many exegetical non-sense) come from the unjustified assump-
tions that (i) “kata symbebekos” always means “accidentally”, (ii) is equivalent to “non-necessarily” and (iii) has a 
whole sentence as its scope. I have explored this issue at Angioni [006], p. 4-3, 50-. More particularly, in 
[007] and [009] I have explored what “kata symbebekos” means in the context of Aristotle’s theory of scientific 
demonstration.
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term is being taken according to the description that gives its basic meaning and independently 
of its being attributed to a particular thing. Consider the following sentences:
(a) “this man [= Socrates] is white”.
(b) “this white man [= Socrates] is white”.
(c) “white (in this context) is df. a body that has whiteness”.
Sentence (c) takes “white” kath’ hauto (or per se) without focusing on what depends on 
white’s being attributed to something else.55 Actually, sentence (c) gives the rule for a correct 
application of “white” in some contexts inasmuch as it focuses on what whatever object must be 
to be called white, no matter which thing is actually called white. Alternatively, “white” might 
be introducing in the context of 03b7-8 whiteness itself,56 that is, a quality in the genus of 
colours etc. We will have, then:
(c’) “white is df. such and such a colour”.
Whether one prefer (c) or (c’), the important point for my purposes is that such a kind of 
definitional statement is precisely what Aristotle seems to have in mind at 03b7-8. The ex-
pression “pathos” in step (vi) at 03b7-8 focuses on that which may be attributed to something 
else but is not actually (in the context of a sentence like (c) or (c’)) being attributed to a particu-
lar thing. Sentences like (c) and (c’) must be understood as a logikos definitional statement in 
which white (namely, whatever white thing or, alternatively, whiteness itself) is the same as its 
essence  (namely, a body that has whiteness or, alternatively, such and such a colour). Thus, it is 
no surprise that Aristotle says that white qua property is the same as its essence at 03b7-8.
On the other hand, in sentences like (a) and (b), the property of being “white” is attrib-
uted to a given thing, namely, this man or this white man, so that “white” turns out to be a true 
denomination for this man or this white man on this condition: “white” in such a context – as in 
55  At Metaphysics V-7, 07b ff., “kath’ hauta” can be taken in this way: “kath’ hauto” only means that a 
given term (which is normally used as predicate, such as “healthy”, 07b8) is being taken in itself, that is, 
apart from its attributive relation to something else.
56  Ross [94, p.76, 79] takes “pathos” as “the quality white” (Revised Oxford Translation: “the attribute 
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many other contexts that presupposes (a) or (b) as a previous condition57 – denotes the subject 
to which the property of being white is attributed, namely, this man or this white man.58 This 
man is what “white” signifies (“semainei”, 03b3) in such a context. As I have said, what the 
term denotes is more important than its straightforward meaning in this case: the term “white” is 
taken according to what it happens to refer. Now, on these conditions, it is not true to say that 
“white” is the same as its essence: “white” refers to a given man that happens to have whiteness 
in his body, and a particular man that happens to have whiteness in his body is not the same as 
being a body that has whiteness.
To make the point clearer: Aristotle’s issue at 03a-8 is only whether the essence of 
white is or is not the same as a man or as a white man. This is very different from the question 
examined at 03a9-8: whether accidental compounds are the same as their essences. His 
negative answer only means that white man is not the same as the essence of white, but the term 
“white” has no claim to describe the essence of white man. White man is just what happens to 
be the reference of “white” in a given context. Now, this is far from affecting the claim that white 
man is the same as the essence of white man. The distinction captured by sentences like (a)-(b) 
and (c) can easily be applied to accidental compounds as well. Consider, for example:
(d) “this white man [= Socrates] is a white man”.
(e) “white man is df. a biped animal that has whiteness”.
Sentence (e) focuses on what whatever object must be to be called a white man. It ex-
plains what “white man” means independently of being attributed to a particular man. On the 
other hand, sentence (d) attributes the description “white man” to a particular man, say, Socra-
tes. Aristotle’s reasoning at 03b-8 can be applied to sentence (d): the reference of “white 
man” in (d) is restricted to the particular man at stake, Socrates, which happens to have the 
relevant feature to be called “white man”, but also has a being of his own besides the property 
of being a white man. It is clear that the essence of white man is not the same as Socrates: the 
description “a biped animal that has whiteness” is not coextensive with “Socrates”. This means 
57  For instance, in a sentence such as “the white is musical”, “white” pressuposes (a) and so denotes a man 
that is white.  See Posterior Analytics 83a0-.
58  I have developed this point in Angioni 006: 4-3.
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that, when “white man” is used “kata symbebekos”, that is, when it is used attributively and is 
taken according to what it refers to (namely, Socrates, in this case), it is not the same as its es-
sence – similarly, when “white” is used “kata symbebekos”, that is, when it is used attributively 
and is taken according to what it refers to (namely, a particular man or a particular white man), 
it is not the same as its essence. Now, this is far from affecting the coextensiveness that holds in 
sentence (e). When the description “white man” is taken in itself but not “kata symbebekos”, it is 
the same as its essence: the description “white man” taken as definiendum is coextensive with 
the more accurate description that specifies what “white man” means. 
6.
This leads me to the concluding remarks in Z-6: “It is clear, then, that, for primary things 
as well as for per se things, each thing is one and the same as its essence” (03a4-6, my own 
translation).
Two or three issues must be addressed. What the term “primary” is picking up at this con-
text, what the description “a thing that is said per se” is picking up and, consequently, what is the 
relation between the extensions of these two expressions. Together, they seem to exhaust the 
extension of things for which it is true to say that an essence is one and the same as the thing 
it is the essence of. 
Most scholars believe that “primary” is taking up the primary things introduced at Z-4, 
030a0-4. I agree with this, since it is true that coextensiviness between definiendum and 
definiens holds for the definitions of primary things. But I cannot any more agree with the claim 
that the description “a thing that is said per se” is equivalent to “primary”. This claim cannot rely 
on what Aristotle says at 03b3-4, when he talks about “things that are not said of others, but 
are per se and primary”.59 Primary things that are what they are independently of “one thing 
being attributed to the other” (030a0-4) are surely per se things, but this does not guarantee 
that the converse is also true, namely, that all per se things are primary in this sense. I argue that 
59  Translators take the expressions as equivalent: so Ross and ROT (“each primary and self-subsistent 
thing”) and Bostock (“things that are primary and spoken of in their own right”). For a view somehow similar 
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the description “things said per se” at 03a5 is opposed only to terms used in an attributive way 
(“kata symbebekos”) and, therefore, picks up whatever term inasmuch as it is not applied to a 
particular thing (“ou kata symbebekos”).60 Thereby, the extension of this description at 03a5 is 
as liberal as the extension of definienda at the logikos level: items from every category can be 
subtracted from attributive sentences and be taken in themselves for an account of what they 
mean. “White” can be taken per se as well as “man”. An even “cloak” or “white man” can be taken 
per se at a logikos level, in which it is universally true that each thing is the same as its essence, 
that is, every definiendum is coextensive with its definiens account. 
Aristotle concluding words at Z-6 are very enlightening: “It has been explained, then, how 
an essence is the same as each thing, and how it is not” (03a0-, my own translation).
Aristotle believes to have established on which conditions things are the same as their 
essences and on which conditions they are not. His phrasing is relevant: he does not say which 
things are the same as their essences and which are not, but how the ones that are the same are 
the same and how the ones that are not are not.6 Looking back to our contrast between sen-
tences like (a) and (c) or (d) and (e), we can clearly see that things are not the same as their es-
sence when the terms introducing them are taken attributively as referring to particular things, 
like in (a) and (d): 
(a) “this man [= Socrates] is white”.
(d) “this white man [= Socrates] is a white man”.
It is tempting to suggest that this would also be true for substantial sortals like “man”. 
Consider again:
60  It might also be argued that “kath’ hauto” changes its meaning from 03b3 to 03a5: the former con-
text works with per se3, whereas the latter works with the logikos per se. But I do not believe that “kath’ hauto” at 
03b3 can be taken as per se3, for it refers to Platonic Forms, and one of the criticisms against Platonic forms 
is that they depend on elements that are heterogeneously distinct from each other and thus lack intrinsic unity 
(see Metaphysics 039a3-4, as well as chapter Z-4 as a whole).
6  In other words, Aristotle has not (and could not have) given a list of things that are the same as their 
essence (for instance, substances) and a list of things that are not the same (for instance, accidental compoun-
ds). He has rather suggested that “things” in general can be the same or not with their essence according to the 
way they are taken.
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(f) “this man [Socrates] is a man”;
(g) “man is df. a biped animal”.
The being for Socrates qua man may well be the same as the being-for-man.6 But if one 
takes Socrates qua Socrates, i.e., if one takes Socrates with all the relevant properties that make 
him the individual he is (and make him different from all the other individuals of the same 
species), it would be more difficult to make sense of the claim that Socrates is the same as be-
ing-for-man.63 This is not the place to discuss whether individual essences or individual forms 
are needed.64 Actually, instead of arguing in this direction, Aristotle’s discussion about essence 
and definition in the following chapters of Metaphysics will take a different route: Aristotle will 
focus on the relationship between the elements in a definiens account. His issues then will be 
whether and how the relationship between the elements in a definiens account will explain 
how the elements of the definiendum make up one unified thing. Essence and definition will be 
examined from an explanatory point of view with reference to real causal relations. In this way, 
it is tempting to suggest that Aristotle final remarks at Z-6 represents the end of a de dicto ex-
amination (the logikos approach) and prompts the beginning of a de re approach – as if he were 
saying: “we have examined enough how terms and definitions stand to each other from the 
point of view of their logical relations; let us now take a closer look on how things themselves 
6  See Code [98], p. -3 for a view along these lines.
63  One way of trying to make sense of it is to say that essences are by their nature universals and that the 
particular features that makes Socrates the individual he is (different from all others of the same species) are 
not relevant for his essence: his essence amounts to being a man. But I doubt whether this way really works. 
Charles [0], p. 66 suggests that the assumption that being for Socrates is being for man comes only from 
the fact that “we have been given little advice as to what being Socrates might be”. Actually, Aristotle has never 
tackled the issues whether the particular features of Socrates are relevant or not for the “essence of Socrates” 
and whether there are individual essences at all. He was not concerned with these questions at the extant texts. 
However, from this one cannot conclude that his official doctrine was that essence is always universal.
64  If my interpretation is right, and if Aristotle’s remarks at 03a6-8 are taken seriously, there is room for 
a description to be taken as “the essence of Socrates”: the description collecting the relevant features that make 
him the individual he is and make him different from all co-specific individuals. However, this “essence of 
Socrates” will only play a role at a logikos level (like the “essence of white man”) and will have no consequence 
on the deep metaphysical issue about individual essences. Thus, my view has nothing to do with the kind of 
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are and what are their causal relations in order to establish what essence is and how definitions 
must capture the causal role of essences”.65
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ABSTRACT
I discuss Aristotle’s views in Metaphysics VII-6 (Z-6) on the issue whether each thing is the same as its essence. 
I propose a deflationary interpretation according to which Z-6 develops a “logical approach” (logikos) in which 
“sameness” amounts only to coextensiveness between definiendum and definiens with no attention to more specific 
issues about ontological and explanatory features of definitions.
Keywords: essencialism, substance, definition, identity, sameness, predication.
RESUMO
Discuto o que Aristóteles quer dizer em Metafísica VII-6 (Z-6) ao procurar discernir se cada coisa é idêntica a 
sua essência. De acordo com minha proposta, Z-6 ainda se circunscreve em um “ponto de vista lógico” (logikos) 
no qual “X ser o mesmo que Y” deve ser entendido apenas em termos de coextensão entre definiendum e definiens, 
sem nenhuma preocupação com questões mais específicas a respeito da ontolologia e do poder explanatório das 
definições.
Palavras-chave: essencialismo, substância, definição, identidade, teoria da predicação
Recebido em 04/20103 
Aprovado em 05/2013
THINGS ARE THE SAME AS THEIR “ESSENCES”? NOTES ON ARISTOTLE’S METAPHYSICS Z-6
